Desk rejection in an academic publication market model with matching frictions by Vranceanu, Radu et al.
Desk rejection in an academic publication market model
with matching frictions
Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Kim Huynh
To cite this version:
Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Kim Huynh. Desk rejection in an academic publication
market model with matching frictions. ESSECWorking paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC
/ Centre de recherche de l’ESSEC ISSN : 1291-961.. 2009. <hal-00554732>
HAL Id: hal-00554732
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00554732
Submitted on 11 Jan 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Centre de recherche
©
 G
RO
U
PE
 E
SS
EC
 - 
27
11
09
09
19
ESSEC Business School Paris
avenue bernard hirsch - BP 50105 CERGY
95021 cergy-pontoise cedex - france
tél. +33 (0)1 34 43 30 00 - fax +33 (0)1 34 43 30 01
www.essec.fr
ESSEC executive EDUCATION
CNIT - BP 230
92053 PARIS LA DéFENSE - FRANCE
TéL. +33 (0)1 46 92 49 00 - fax +33 (0)1 46 92 49 90
http://formation.essec.fr
ESSEC Business school, singapore campus
100 Victoria Street - National Library Building #13-02
Singapore 188064 
Tél. +65 6884 9780 - Fax +65 6884 9781
www.essec.edu
DESK REJECTION IN AN ACADEMIC PUBLICATION
MARKET MODEL WITH MATCHING FRICTIONS
DAMIEN BESANCENOT
KIM HUYNH
RADU VRANCEANU
Pour tous renseignements :
• Centre de Recherche/Research Center
Tél. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
research.center@essec.fr
• Visitez notre site
www.essec.fr
D
R
 0
90
0
8
november 2009
Document de Recherche ESSEC / ISSN : 1291-9616 
 
 
Il est interdit de reproduire ce document ou d'en citer des extraits  
sans l'autorisation écrite des auteurs.  
It is forbidden to quote all or part of this document without the written consent of the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- DR 09008 - 
 
 
 
Desk Rejection in an Academic Publication Market 
Model with Matching Frictions 
 
 
Damien BESANCENOT*, Kim HUYNH†, Radu VRANCEANU‡
 
 
 
November 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
* CEPN and University Paris 13, Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: besancenot.damien@univ-paris13.fr
† LEM and University Paris 2, France, E-mail: kim.besancenot@u-paris2.fr
‡ ESSEC Business School, PB 50150, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: vranceanu@essec.fr
I 
Desk Rejection in an Academic Publication Market 
Model with Matching Frictions 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Subject to a huge and growing number of journal titles in business and economics, scholars sometimes 
target the wrong journal. Editors resort more and more to paper pre-screening, and desk reject those that 
do not fit well to the editorial line. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic 
publications that brings into the picture these matching frictions. The key modelling device is a paper-
journal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. Our main 
endogenous variables are the submission fee and the tension in the publication market, itself directly 
related to the number of journal titles. 
 
 
Key-Words: 
 
- Academic Journals 
- Desk Rejection 
- Editors 
- Imperfect Information 
- Matching 
 
 
 
RESUME :  
 
De plus en plus souvent les éditeurs de revues académiques procèdent à une vérification préalable des 
articles soumis et rejettent d'office ceux qui ne correspondent pas à la ligne éditoriale de leur revue. Nous 
étudions ce phénomène nouveau à l'aide d'un modèle d'appariement, inspiré des travaux en économie du 
travail. 
 
 
Mots-clés : 
 
- Appariement  
- Editeurs 
- Information imparfaite 
- Revues académiques 
 
 
 
JEL classification : C78, A14
II 
November 12, 2009
DESK REJECTION IN AN ACADEMIC PUBLICATION MARKET
MODEL WITH MATCHING FRICTIONS
Damien Besancenot, Kim Huynhy, Radu Vranceanuz
Abstract
Subject to a huge and growing number of journal titles in business and economics, scholars sometimes
target the wrong journal. Editors resort more and more to paper pre-screening, and desk reject those that
do not t well to the editorial line. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic
publications that brings into the picture these matching frictions. The key modelling device is a paper-
journal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. Our main
endogenous variables are the submission fee and the tension in the publication market, itself directly
related to the number of journal titles.
Keywords: Academic journals, Matching, Editors, Desk rejection, Imperfect information.
JEL Classication : C78, A14.
CEPN and Université Paris 13, Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: besancenot.damien@univ-paris13.fr
yLEM and Université Paris 2, 75007 Paris, France. E-mail: kim.besancenot@u-paris2.fr
zESSEC Business School, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: vranceanu@essec.fr.
1 Introduction
For many years, analyses of the academic publication market in business and economics were
essentially empirical; most studies dealt with issues such as the various patterns of publication,
publication rankings of departments and universities, journal prestige hierarchies, and so on.
Sometimes regression analysis was applied to identify the various success factors. In the last few
years, several theoretical analyses aimed to analyze the publication market by bringing into the
picture its more idiosyncratic features, such as the various research spill-over e¤ects, duality in
scientic discovery, congestion in information processing, etc. Special focus was placed on the
paper evaluation process, where anonymous referees agree on spending their time without explicit
compensation a challenge to the homo economicus model to assess the quality of the papers
submitted by their peers.
The publication market can be dened as the place where scholars supply and editors demand
academic papers. This paper contributes to the literature on academic publication by providing a
dynamic allocation model that builds on the traditional matching model pioneered by Pissarides
(2000) in the labor market context.1 The advantage of this model is not only that it allows to
study the market in terms of ows of submissions, publications and drop-outs, but also to take into
account the informational frictions specic to this market. In a world where the number of scholars
aiming at publishing their work and the number of journal titles are increasing dramatically, these
frictions can no longer be considered as a marginal feature. These days, many submitted articles
get "desk-rejections" because the editor considers that they do not t well to the aim and scope of
the journal.2 Furthermore, editors themselves search more or less actively for the most interesting
papers. For instance, Laband and Piette (1994) argue that editors act as real prospectors of good
papers by asking friends or close colleagues to submit and publish their best work. Some editors
deliberately cultivate links with major institutions or leading researchers in order to spot best
research projects and bring them to their journals (Chew et al. 2007). Finally, as pointed out by
1 The substantial contribution of Dale Mortensen to this literature should also be acknowledged here (Mortensen,
1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). See also Cahuc and Zylbeberg (2004) for a thorough description of the
matching approach to labor markets.
2 Some prestigious journals such as the Journal of Monetary Economics, have recently acknowledged that desk
rejection became one o¢ cial element of their editorial policy.
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Macdonald and Kam (2007) or Medo¤ (2003), sometimes editors invite submissions and fast track
the acceptance of papers by authors who could boost the measured quality of their journals.
Except the very few leading journals, second-tier journals cannot always manage to ll their
editorial space with high quality papers. They either publish a smaller than planned number of
papers, or publish less original pieces. In this paper we leave aside the leading journal oligopoly,
to focus on the myriad of second-tier journals. This segment of the market is competitive: there
are many utility maximizing editors that can enter and exit the market almost without costs.
This context replicates to a large extent the labor market mechanism where unemployed persons
search for jobs and employers must post vacancies in order to attract workers.
The model describes the standard interaction between scholars and editors. Scholars write
papers and send them to journals in order to have them published. At the journal level, the
evaluation process is two-stage. At the rst stage, the editor checks whether the paper matches
the editorial line, without having any judgement about the quality of the paper. A successful
match occurs if the paper is accepted at this pre-screening stage. In the opposite case, the paper
is desk-rejected. At the second stage, the paper is sent to reviewers for standard evaluation of its
quality. The refereeing mechanism is introduced in a simplied way, by assigning xed probabilities
of acceptance, rejection or revision.
Frictions, such as understood by the labor economics, occur at the rst stage where we ac-
knowledge that the number of successful matches should be smaller than both the number of
papers and the number of available journal slots. The original contribution of this paper is to
introduce a matching function that connects the number of successful matches to the number of
authors and the number of editors, having properties that were extensively tested by the labor
economists.
In this context, equilibrium is dened as a situation where both scholars and editors implement
their optimal plans, given the matching technology and the socially determined rent-sharing rule.
We show that the model presents at most one stable equilibrium, that can be achieved for a
broad range of parameters. A graphic solution is provided for a general matching function, and a
numerical simulation is provided for a specic CES matching technology.
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The model has two key endogenous variables, the tension in the publication market, dened
as the ratio between the number of editors (journals) and the number of authors (papers), and
the submission fee. Twenty years ago almost no economic journal charged submission fees. These
days submission fees are almost generalized; they vary from modest amounts to quite substantial
ones (some journals require now submission fees as high as 250 $). In the same period, the number
of titles in business administration and economics has increased dramatically (Frey et al., 2009).
These evolutions can be rationalized in the light of our model by changes in the parameters, such
an increase in the scholars utility from publishing a paper.
While the literature on academic publication is now a well established eld, there are not
many theoretical analyses within the search and matching perspectives. Besancenot et al. (2009)
worked out an equilibrium search model, where authors submit papers and editors search for
papers. Editors can be either highly demanding, thus accepting only top papers with a small
probability, or tolerant, accepting all papers. In equilibrium, authors optimally decide whether to
write high or low quality papers. Lee (2009) acknowledges that matching frictions are a key feature
of the publication market, enhanced by the rule according to which a paper cannot be submitted to
several journals at the same time. He works out a paper allocation model, similar to an equilibrium
search model, and analyses the equilibria. The main result is that frictions in the market, leading to
higher delays in publication, could support an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where high-quality
papers are published by top-tier journals, and lower quality papers are published by second-tier
journals. At di¤erence with these papers, in our model journals have identical qualities and publish
only good quality papers. This is the price to pay for developing an explicit dynamic analysis of
the matching process that is not available elsewhere.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main assumption. Section
3 presents the equilibrium and study its main properties. A numerical example is also provided.
We present our conclusions in the last section.
3
2 Main assumptions
We analyze the academic publication market as a place where scholars look for suited journals
to publish their papers, and editors search for suited papers to publish in their journals, given
informational frictions about the good t of a paper with the aim and scope of the journal. Journals
are specialized or have their own philosophy. A good quality paper, well suited for one journal,
might not match the editorial line of another journal. Such structural mismatch can justify the
existence of frictions in the publication market and additional delays in publication. Only if a
paper matches the editorial line, it will be sent to referees for an assessment of its quality.
2.1 The matching function
In general, a journal publishes several papers, with a regular frequency. To keep the model as
simple as possible, we consider that each period, each editor can publish one paper. Each scholar
writes one paper per period. The number of papers, identical to the number of authors, A; is
given, the number of editors, denoted by E; can vary. We admit that in the long run, editors can
freely enter or exit this market.
Editors search for those papers best suited for their journal, scholars search for journals. A
successful match between an author and a journal takes place when the author sends the paper
to a journal interested in the topic of the paper. Authors have no perfect information about the
editorial line of a journal and can target a wrong journal. We denote the number of successful
matches per period by M . If the topic of the paper matches the journals scope, the editor will
proceed with the standard evaluation process.
Building on traditional assumptions in the labor market literature, we assume that number
of successful matches M can be written as a smoothly increasing function in both E and A:
such a matching function has the general form M = M(E;A); with @M(; )=@E = ME > 0; and
@M(; )=@A = MA > 0: The matching function must comply with one important restriction: the
number of matches cannot exceed the smallest between the number of papers and the number of
available journal slots, i.e.: M(E;A) < minfE;Ag: Furthermore, we adopt the same simplifying
assumption as traditional labor literature, and consider that M(E;A) is homogenous of degree
4
one: M(E; A) = M(E;A);8: This additional restriction not only simplies calculations, but
also guarantees that matching probabilities have the good properties.
Before turning to matching probabilities, we introduce as an important variable the ratio
between the number of editors and the number of authors,  = E=A: The ratio is a good proxy for
the "tension" in the publication market. If  is small, we have an "editor market", if  is large,
we we have an "author market". So, the higher , the more favorable to authors is the market. In
the special case where (E = A) , ( = 1); if there were no frictions in this market, each author
should be able to have its paper reviewed by a journal, and every journal should get as many
papers as empty slots.
Since the function M(E;A) is homogenous of degree one, we can write the probability that the
editor gets a suited paper as a function of  only:3
M(E;A)
E
=M(1; A=E) =M(1;  1) = m();
with dm()=d =   2MA(1;  1) < 0: The larger ; the more editors relative to authors are
present in the market, and the smaller chances of an editor to get a good paper.
We can write the probability that the author meets the right editor by:
M(E;A)
A
=M(E=A; 1) =M(; 1) =

E
A

M(1; A=E) = m();
with d [m()] =d = m() + m0() = dM(;1)d > 0: In this case, the larger ; the more editors
relative to authors, and the bigger are chances of an author to target a journal whose editorial line
is close to the topic of the paper. In practice, the newly created journal titles go toward deeper
and deeper specialization; this more precise denition of the scope should help guiding the initial
choice of the author. The complementary probability 1  m() is the probability for a submitted
paper to be desk-rejected.
Our model will be solved for a general function M(E;A): In the last section, we will use a
specic CES matching function M(E;A) =
 
A 1 + E 1
 1
to work out a numerical example.
It can be easily checked that this function has the right properties.4 In this special case the
3 We have M(E; A) = M(E;A); 8: For ^ = 1=E; the former identity becomes M(1; A=E) =M(E;A)=E:
4 In empirical work (simulations), labor economists use extensively the Cobb-Douglas form, although a function
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probability of the editor to nd an author becomes m() = (1 + ) 1 and the probability of the
author to nd an editor is dened by m() = = (1 + ) :
2.2 The refereeing process
Once that the editor gets a paper well-tted to his journal, he will proceeds to an evaluation
of the quality of the text through a standard refereeing process. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to go in the depth of this mechanism.5 We only acknowledge here that there are three
possible outcomes of the refereeing process: the paper can either be accepted with the probability
p; referee rejected with the probability q; or send back for changes and clarications under a revise
and resubmit decision, with the probability 1  p  q:
Furthermore, when the editor receives a revised paper, he will send it back to referees for an
additional revision round. To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider here that the
probabilities p and q do not change from one revision round to another.6
2.3 The expected intertemporal utility of the scholar, W
At each time period, the scholar writes one paper and, following the standard norm in academia, he
submits it for publication to only one journal. Because of informational frictions in the publication
market, he will meet an editor interested in his work with the probability m(): Denoting by 
the scholars discount factor, his intertemporal expected utility prior to sending his paper to a
journal is:
W = (1  m())W + m() f s+ [pWA + qWE + (1  p  q)WR]g (1)
In this expression, the rst term is the expected gain if the match was unsuccessful; in this case,
that occurs with probability (1  m()) ; at the next period the scholar will submit his paper to
another journal, and will be subject to a similar problem. If the match is successful (which can
happen with probability m()), the scholar pays the submission fee s and waits for the editors
y = xa1x
1 a
2 does not satisfy the property y < min(x1; x2): A few scholars have considered the CES form as a
possible alternative (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2000).
5 See Besancenot and Vranceanu (2008) for a more thorough description of the paper selection process with two
type of papers (high and low quality) and two types of referees (expert and normal).
6 In general, the probability to have a paper accepted tends to increase with the number of revision rounds,
thus our assumption brings about an undervalued intertemporal utility from writing a paper in the rst place.
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decision. The latter takes advice from referees, then either accepts the paper, which worth then
WA; or rejects the paper, which worth thenWE ; or ask for changes before the author can resubmit
the paper, which worth then WR: In order to focus on the desk-rejection issue, we assume in this
paper that the refereesdecision is immediate. During our career we all have experienced with at
least some unbelievable delays in the refereeing process. Introducing a one period answering delay
would complicate much the expressions7 , without modifying the basic structure of the problem
and the main insights. On a Occam razor principle, we chose here the simple form.
If the paper is accepted, the author gets the intertemporal utility of one additional publication
u0, and, being "freed" from this paper, he can write a new one.8 The e¤ort of writing a new paper
entails a cost c0: We denote the net intertemporal gain from an accepted paper by u = u0   c0: At
the next period, the new paper will worth W as well. Hence, the expected intertemporal utility
of an accepted paper WA is elementary:
WA = u+ W: (2)
In general, when a paper is referee rejected, the author takes into account the main remarks and
upgrades his paper before resubmitting it to another journal, one period later. Let us denote by c
this cost of revising the paper. Then, the expected intertemporal utility of the author of a rejected
paper, WE , is merely:
WE =  c+ W (3)
In the revise and resubmit case, the e¤ort needed to upgrade the paper also comes with a cost. To
keep calculations simple, we assume this cost to be identical to the cost of upgrading a rejected
paper, c: Once the paper revised, after one period the author will send it back to the editor, who
proceeds to the evaluation of the new version and takes one of the available decisions, i.e.: accept,
reject, or revise and resubmit. Hence, the expected intertemporal utility of the author with a
7 Besides ; we would have to manage a 2 and even a 3:
8 Here we assume u to be invariant in time. For the young professor, the value of the rst papers published
should be larger than of the next ones.
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revise and resubmit letter in hands, WR; is:
WR =  c+  [pWA + qWE + (1  p  q)WR]
=
 c+  [p (u+ W ) + q ( c+ W )]
1  (1  p  q) (4)
This system of four equations (1, 2, 3, 4) allows us to explicitly determine the intertemporal
expected utility of the author W :
W = (1  m())W + m() f s+ [pWA + qWE + (1  p  q)WR]g
=
f s (1  (1  p  q)) + pu  c(1  p)g
(1  )
h
1
m() (1   (1  p  q)) +  (1  p  q)
i (5)
or, in a general form, as:
W =W (
 
s;
+
u;
 
c;
+
m()): (6)
where labels above the main variables indicate the signs of the partial derivatives.
For sure, the researcher will participate to this market only if the intertemporal utility exceeds
a reservation threshold, that, for simplicity, we normalize to zero, or: W  0.
2.4 The expected intertemporal utility of the editor, V
At each time period, each editor has one open publication slot. With the probability 1  m();
he receives an unsuited paper that he will return to the author with a desk rejected decision, and
with the probability m() he gets a suited paper. In this case, he charges the author a submission
fee s; then send the paper to the referees. The latter immediately decides whether to accept the
paper, revise and resubmit, or reject it. In the last two cases, the journal pages are kept empty
for this period and the editor must bear an opportunity cost connected to idle resources, denoted
by z.
Denoting by VA the expected intertemporal utility of an accepted paper (from the point of
view of the editor), by VE the expected intertemporal utility of a rejected paper and by VR the
expected intertemporal utility of a paper sent back for revisions, the expected intertemporal payo¤
of the editor can be written as:
V = (1 m())VE +m() fs+ [pVA + qVE + (1  p  q)VR]g (7)
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The denition of VE is elementary:
VE =  z + V: (8)
If the editor rejects the paper, he must bear the empty slot cost z and, one period later, is
submitted to the same decision problem, and has the same expected intertemporal utility V:
An accepted paper brings to the editor an intertemporal gain h; and, since at the next period
he will publish a new edition of the journal, he will have another available slot, that worth V too.
Hence the denition of VA is elementary as well:
VA = h+ V: (9)
Finally, if the editor ask for a revision, he must bear the cost of an empty slot z, and, at the next
period, he gets a revised version of the initial paper which he can accept, reject, or send back for
another revision. The expected intertemporal utility VR can thus be written:
VR =  z +  [pVA + qVE + (1  p  q)VR]
=
 z +  [ph  qz + V (p+ q)]
1  (1  p  q) : (10)
The system of four equations (7, 8, 9 and 10) and four unknowns allows us to provide an explicit
denition of V :
V = (1 m()) [ z + V ] +m() fs+ [pVA + qVE + (1  p  q)VR]g
=
m() fs [1  (1  p  q)] + ph+ z [p  (1  p  q)]g   z f1  (1  p  q)g
(1  ) f(1  (1  p  q)) +m() (1  (p+ q))g : (11)
or, in a more compact form, as:
V = V (
+
s;
+
h;
 
z;
+
m()) (12)
where the labels above indicate the signs of the partial derivatives with respect to the key variables.
3 Solving the model
3.1 The editor free entry condition and the s = () relationship
Let us denote by V the reservation intertemporal utility level of an editor, with V > 0: Under free
entry, new editors enter the publication market as long as they expect that the intertemporal gain
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from this economic activity is larger than V . Thus, under free entry, the expected intertemporal
utility V (Eq. 11) is driven to V in the long-run. The condition V = V allows us to put forward
a rst relationship between the tension in the publication marker, ; itself related to the number
of editors in the market, and the submission fee s: More in detail, we have:
V =
m() fs [1  (1  p  q)] + phg   z f[1  (1  p  q)] m() [p  (1  p  q)]g
(1  ) f(1  (1  p  q)) +m() (1  (p+ q))g =
V
(13)
, m() fs [1  (1  p  q)] + phg   z f[1  (1  p  q)] m() [p  (1  p  q)]g =
V (1  ) f(1  (1  p  q)) +m() (1  (p+ q))g (14)
or:
s =
z + V (1  )
m()
  z [p  (1  p  q)] + ph
[1  (1  p  q)] +
V (1  ) (1  (p+ q))
[1  (1  p  q)] (15)
Denoting by ()  z+V (1 )m()   z[p (1 p q)]+ph[1 (1 p q)] + V (1 )(1 (p+q))[1 (1 p q)] ; the relationship can be
written s = (); with 0() =  
 
z + V (1  )m0()
m()2
> 0 , lim!0 () =
z(1 p)+ph
[1 (1 p q)] +
V (1  ) 1[1 (1 p q)] > 0 and lim!1() = +1:
The curve () can be either convex or concave ; if we use here the same matching function as
we will resort later for the numerical simulation, i.e.: m() = 1=(1 + ), then () is a line with a
positive slope. We represent it as such in Figure 1.
Recall that editorsintertemporal utility V is increasing with s: All points to the left of the
line s = () correspond to situations where the intertemporal gain of an editor is higher than
V , thus new editors are attracted in this business and the number of editors increases; so does
the tension  = E=A: Points to the right of the line correspond to an intertemporal utility of an
editor lower than V , thus some editors decide to leave the market,  declines over time.
3.2 The rent sharing rule and the s = 	() relationship
In a normally functioning publication market, the representative author obtains the intertemporal
utility W and the representative editor gets the intertemporal utility V: How overall welfare is
divided between the two players is a matter of social organization of this special market, prevailing
institutional arrangements and ultimately the balance of powers between the two players. It is
10
qs
F(q)
V>V
V<V
dq<0
dq>0
_
_
0
Figure 1: Free entry and the s = () relationship
beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth analysis of the surplus sharing mechanism.
In the following we merely assume that the editor gets a share  of the total surplus while the
author gets a share 1  . In other words, denoting the surplus of an author-editor pair by S; we
have: 8>><>>:
W = (1  )S
V = S
(16)
with the parameter  capturing the relative market power of the editors and authors. In turn, this
surplus sharing rule allows us to write that the surplus of the author W is related to the surplus
of the editor by:
W =
(1  )

V: (17)
In the long run (free entry), editorsexpected intertemporal value is V ; hence, the long run authors
intertemporal utility can be expressed as a function of V and  :
W =
(1  )

V : (18)
Replacing in the former equation W by its explicit value (Eq. 5), we can put forward another
implicit relationship between s and  :
W =
f s (1  (1  p  q)) + pu  c(1  p)g
(1  )
h
1
m() (1   (1  p  q)) +  (1  p  q)
i = (1  )

V (19)
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qs
Y(q)
W<((1-a)/a)V
W>((1-a)/a)V
ds<0
ds>0
0
Figure 2: Surplus sharing and the s = 	() relationship
or, in an explicit way:
s =
pu  c(1  p)  (1  )

V (1  ) (1  p  q)
(1  (1  p  q))  
(1  ) V (1  )
m()
(20)
Denoting by 	() 
pu  c(1  p)  (1  )

V (1  ) (1  p  q)
(1  (1  p  q))  
(1  )

V (1  )
m()
; the for-
mer relationship can be written in a compact form s = 	(); with	0() =

(1  )

V (1  )

m() + m0()
[m()]
2 >
0; lim!0	() =  1 and lim!1	() =
pu  c(1  p)  (1  )

V (1  )
1  (1  p  q) :
A necessary condition for obtaining a solution is that the horizontal asymptote be positive,
pu   c(1   p)   (1  )

V (1  ) > 0; In the following, we assume this condition to hold: this
requires that the authorsutility from publishing a paper should be relatively large compared to
the reserve utility of the editor or that editors share of surplus be large enough. Then the curve
s = 	() has a concave shape, such as represented in Figure 2.
Recall that scholarsintertemporal utilityW is a decreasing function of s and editorsintertem-
poral utility V is rising with s: All points below the curve s = 	() represent situations where
authorsreward W (Eq. 6) is too big relatively to editorsutility V (Eq. 12) times (1  )=; to
restore the balance, the submission fee is expected to rise. All points above the curve s = 	()
correspond to situations where the submission fee must decline to restore the agreed shares of the
total surplus.
12
qs
Y(q)
F(q)
I
II
0
Figure 3: Equilibrium in the academic publication market
3.3 The equilibrium in the publication market
An equilibrium of this model is dened as a situation where authors and editors implement their
optimal publications plans given the existing matching technology and the socially agreed rent
sharing agreement between the two agents. The equilibrium solution is a pair (; s) that simulta-
neously fullls equations s = () > 0 (the free entry condition, Eq. 15) and s = 	() > 0 (the
surplus sharing condition, Eq. 20). The equilibrium tension in the publication market is implicitly
dened by 	() = (): However, since an explicit solution cannot be obtained for a general form
m(), we solve the problem graphically.
Depending on the parameter values, the problem has no solution, one solution or two solutions.
Figure 3 represents the case where the system of equations has two possible solutions. A careful
analysis of the implicit dynamics of s and  shows that only one of them is stable (Equilibrium
I). Thus, in the following, we will focus only on this equilibrium.
We can now analyze the impact of changes in the main parameters on the equilibrium values
of s and . For so doing, we have to take into account the impact of the parameter changes
on the two curves, s = () and s = 	(). Table 1 presents the partial derivatives @	(; i)=@i
and @(; i)=@i; for i 2 fh; u; p; q; ; g: The signs of these derivatives can be inferred without
ambiguity, except for q:
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Y(q)
F(q)
0
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_
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Figure 4: Impact of parameter change on equilibrium
i @()=@i @	()=@i
z 1m()   [p (1 p q)][1 (1 p q)] > 0 0
u 0 p1 (1 p q) > 0
h   p1 (1 p q) < 0 0
p   V (1 )+z[1+q]+h[1 (1 q)]
[1 (1 p q)]2 < 0
(u+c)[1 (1 q)]+c+(1 ) V (1 )
[1 (1 p q)]2 > 0
q   V (1 )+z[1 p] ph
[1 (1 p q)]2 (sign: undetermined) 
(1 )

V (1 ) pu+c(1 p)
[1 (1 p q)]2 < 0
 0
V (1 )
2
h
(1 p q)
(1 (1 p q)) +
1
m()
i
> 0
V (1 )m() +
(1 )(1 (p+q))
[1 (1 p q)] > 0   (1 ) (1 )(1 p q)1 (1 p q)   (1 ) (1 )m() < 0
c 0   c(1 p)1 (1 p q) < 0
Table 1. Partial derivatives
We represent in Figure 4 how the two curves move in response to positive variations of the
parameters h; u; p; ;  by the respective arrows.
Table 2 indicates the sign of the variation in the equilibrium values of  and s with respect
to variations in parameters such as indicated by comparative statics with the two relationships in
Figure 4.
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z u c h p  V
   +   + + +  
s   +   + + +  
Table 2.
As already mentioned in the introduction, in the last few years, the number of journal titles
tend to increase together with an increase in submission fees. These trends can be related to
documented changes in some of the parameters of our model.
For instance, in the last few years, scholarsutility from publishing a paper (u) tends to in-
crease in line with on-going increasing e¤orts by schools and universities to enhance researchers
productivity. In many regions of the globe (mainly Europe and Asia), governments are imple-
menting reforms that strengthen the ties between academics compensation and their research
performance. The emergence of ubiquitous rankings set additional pressure on deans to reward
research performance more aggressively. According to our analysis, when the net utility u of the
author from a published paper increases, their expected intertemporal gainW goes up. To restore
the balance in keeping with the surplus sharing agreement, the submission fees must increase, so
that the increase in W is partially o¤set; at the same time editors record an increase in their own
intertemporal utility V . In turn, since V becomes greater than V , some editors enter into the
market and  rises, which amplies the rise in surplus for the authors. In the steady sate, both
the number of journal titles () and the submission fees (s) have increased.
Traditionally, the publication of academic papers was driven by a concern for serving the
academic community. In the early years of the 20th century, most academic journals were published
by national and regional associations of researchers. Over time, prot-driven businesses such as the
major publishing houses (Elsevier, Springer, Sage, Blackwell, etc.) have gradually increased their
participation to the academic publication market. Such institutional change could be responsible
for a change in the surplus sharing rule in favour of the editors. If the balance of power between
editors and authors changes such as a bigger share of the surplus goes to editors ( goes up), and
the submission fee should increase. In turn, since V > V ; more editors enter this market and it
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becomes easier for authors to have their papers published, that o¤set to some extent the initial
increase in subsidies. In equilibrium, both s and and  have risen.
Finally, with the development of Internet, many new journals are published on line, which is
tantamount to a reduction in the cost of a vacant journal slot z:9 Such a change has no direct
impact on the authors behavior. However, if z declines, the editors surplus increases. Some
editors will enter the market. With more editors in the market, it becomes easier for authors to
nd a suited journal, and the expected intertemporal value of a paper goes up. To maintain the
agreed surplus sharing balance, the submission fees must increase. In the steady state both s and
 go up
Other parameter changes can be analyzed in a similar way, but it is more di¢ cult to infer any
clear trend from the observed facts. However, one can notice that if the probability p of accepting
papers increases, the editor expects both a reduction in the frequency of empty slots (and the
connected costs) and an increased utility connected to the published papers (for a constant gain
h). The intertemporal utility V exceeds V and more editors enter this market. In turn, it
becomes easier for authors to have their papers accepted (there are more journals, each of them
is less demanding), their benchmark utility W is increasing. To rebalance the rents in favor of
authors, the submission fee must increase. In equilibrium, both s and  rise.
3.4 A numerical example
To provide some additional intuition, we run a numerical simulation using the specic matching
function M(E;A) =
 
A 1 + E 1
 1
; leading to matching probabilities m() = AA+E =
1
1+ and
m() = EA+E =

1+ . The benchmark parameter values are:
u c h z V p q  
3500 100 2000 200 500 0:10 0:75 0:95 0:5
Table 3 displays the impact on the tension ; probabilities m() and m() as well as the
submission fee s from changes in various parameters. The rst line indicates the benchmark
9 For instance, the newly created in the nineties Berkeley Electronic Press publishes today as many as 23 titles
in business and economics. See www.bepress.com/journals/economics.html.
16
solution.10
In the Appendix we calculate the steady state publication rate, pub = pm()m()+(1 m())(p+q)
and steady state total rejection rate, rt = q+p(1 m())m()+(1 m())(p+q) . They are also displayed in the
last two columns of Table 3.
 m() m() s pub rt
Benchmark 1:09 0:48 0:52 251 0:056 0:859
p = 0:11 1:40 0:42 0:58 294 0:068 0:845
q = 0:74 1:10 0:47 0:52 254 0:057 0:852
u+ 10% 1:29 0:44 0:56 295 0:060 0:849
h+ 10% 1:20 0:45 0:55 253 0:058 0:853
z + 10% 0:89 0:53 0:47 246 0:051 0:871
V + 10% 1:04 0:49 0:51 244 0:055 0:863
c+ 10% 1:03 0:49 0:51 239 0:055 0:862
 = 0:55 1:14 0:47 0:53 261 0:057 0:857
Table 3. Outcome of numerical simulations
One interesting additional element is the extreme sensibility of the main variables to changes
in the probability of paper acceptance p: If p increases by one percentage point, the number of
editors in the market would increase by 28% and the submission fees by 17%. A reduction by 10%
of the cost of an empty page c would increase the tension  to 1:31 and the submission fee to 255.
4 Conclusion
In the last few years, the number of journal titles in economics and business administration has
increased dramatically and so did the ow of submissions. In this context, editors are testing new
strategies aimed to preserve the quality of their journals and attract the best contribution. One of
these new strategies is desk-rejection, where the editor decides on his own, prior to taking advice
from referees, whether a paper matches the editorial line of the journal.
10 It should be noticed that, at di¤erence with labor market models that have a solution only for a narrow range
of parameters, this model presents a solution for a relatively broad range of parameters.
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In order to explain this desk rejection phenomenon and to bring into the picture both dynamic
aspects and search frictions, we resort to the matching model pioneered by labor economists. The
key modeling device is a paper-editor matching function, relating the number of successful matches
to the numbers of authors and journals in the market.
Despite its analytical complexity, the model has a straightforward graphical solution. Para-
meter changes have in general unambiguous consequences on the main endogenous variables: the
tension in the publication market and the submission fees. In the light of our analysis, the recent
trends in the market for publication such as the simultaneous increase in submission fees and
number of journal titles can be interpreted as a direct consequence of the rise in authorsutility
from publishing a paper, a shift of the balance of power in favour of editors, or a reduction in the
cost of idle journal pages.
These conclusions do not challenge the implications of static models. However, in markets
characterized by substantial ows, dynamic models bring a touch of realism that has its own
merit. Like the elementary version of the labor market matching model, such a simple model of
the academic publication market can be seen as a good starting point for more powerful analyses,
where the introduction of heterogenous agents or a more active role for editors in the paper
selection process could bring the model closer to reality.
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A Appendix. The steady state stocks of papers
From the scholarspoint of view, at any time t; a given paper can belong to one of four categories:
accepted, rejected by the editor (desk rejection), rejected by referees, or under revision. We denote
the number of accepted papers by PUBt; the number of papers rejected after consideration by
referees by REJt; the number of papers under revision by the authors by REVt; and the number
of desk rejections by NEt. The number of papers, identical to the number of authors, has been
denoted by A and was assumed to be constant. Hence, at any time period, the former identity
holds:
A = PUBt +REJt +REVt +NEt (21)
The stock of each category varies in time in keeping with the editorial decisions (such as sum-
marized by p and q) and the matching probabilities. The total number of new submissions being
PUBt 1 +REJt 1 +NEt 1; we get:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
PUBt = p [m()(PUBt 1 +REJt 1 +NEt 1) +REVt 1]
REJt = q [m()(PUBt 1 +REJt 1 +NEt 1) +REVt 1]
REVt = (1  p  q) [m()(PUBt 1 +REJt 1 +NEt 1) +REVt 1]
NEt = (1  m())(PUBt 1 +REJt 1 +NEt 1)
(22)
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In the steady state, we have xt = xt 1; 8x 2 fPUB;REJ;REV;NEg, so it turns out that:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
PUBt = p [m()(PUBt +REJt +NEt) +REVt] = pX
REJt = q [m()(PUBt +REJt +NEt) +REVt] = qX
REVt = (1  p  q) [m()(PUBt +REJt +NEt) +REVt] = (1  p  q)X
NEt =
(1 m())
m() (PUBt +REJt) =
(1 m())
m() (p+ q)X
(23)
where: m()(PUBt +REJt +NEt) +REVt = X: Starting from this denition of X; we obtain
after some calculations:
X  m()
m() + (1  m())(p+ q)A (24)
with
@X
@[m()]
> 0:
The steady state stocks of papers can be written:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
PUB = pm()m()+(1 m())(p+q)A
REJ = qm()m()+(1 m())(p+q)A
REV = (1 p q)m()m()+(1 m())(p+q)A
NE = (1 m())(p+q)m()+(1 m())(p+q)A
(25)
It can easily be shown that dPUB=d(m()) > 0 and dREJ=d(m()) > 0 if the number of editors
goes up, the probability that the authors nds the "right" editor increases and both the overall
stock of publications and referee rejections increase.
We also calculate the overall stock of rejected papers RT;made up of desk rejected (unmatched)
papers NE; and matched but referee rejected papers REJ: Here REJ is an increasing function
of m() while NE is a decreasing function of m(). The total stock of rejected papers is thus:
RT =
qm() + (1  m())(p+ q)
m() + (1  m())(p+ q) A =
q + p(1  m())
m() + (1  m())(p+ q)A (26)
with: dRTd(m()) =   (1 q)(p+q)[m()+(1 m())(p+q)]2 < 0:
If the number of editors goes up, the probability that the authors nds the right editor increases
and the probability that he will get a desk rejection decreases. This latter e¤ect takes over the
increase in referee rejection: the stock of rejected papers declines.
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